Monday 13 October 2008

Silence

When voices are raised too loudly my inclination is to retreat to a place of silence. To speak on our 'current situation'--to have an opinion, to have an explanation--seems to me a waste of breath.

Every opinion projects the shadow of its own nullification, and every explanation contains the seed of its own negation. None can claim to be 'true'. The ones that succeed, the opinions we come to take for granted, do so not by virtue of possessing 'truth' in some essential, philosophical sense, but by virtue of being more powerful than their competitors.

I'm tired of power, and the will-to-truth that masks power. I seek refuge. I find myself turning instead to those beautiful lies--those mad, glorious, beautiful lies--that substitute truth with a beautiful dream: Marxism, mystical idealism, art.

I find myself turning to Wagner's Ring, which pitches all three lies against Power to see what might happen.

They lose.

Listening to the shimmering theme in E Flat Major that marks the beginning of Das Rheingold is like listening to the birth of the world: out of nothing, out of silence: music. It is the sound of a pure cosmic maternity dreaming creation into being. One wants it to never end--one dreams of existing in a state of perpetual natality--but the theme is interrupted by the singing of the Rhinemaidens, which attracts Alberich, who by renouncing love sets in motion the events of the drama.

The theme is sullied, and is never again heard in its pure form, though it is repeated throughout the Cycle, most notably in the immolation scene that brings Götterdämmerung to an end. Here, theme is stacked upon theme, and the history of creation is recapitulated, as the world ends in flood and fire. The dream might have turned into a nightmare, but now all is cleansed, all is left in silence.

As it was. But what came in between: what a valiant defeat! It is a lesson. We will all be defeated by death, but in between, how valiantly we strove towards silence...!

Read on...

Wednesday 16 July 2008

Apocalypto-go-go: the Sequel

Last March I noticed a spike in apocalyptic climate change predictions across the Web, and posted about the phenomenon here on this blog. Mostly it was a tongue-in-cheek entry. I'd lived through apocalypses before: the 1980s had sometimes felt like one long minute before nuclear midnight, yet somehow the Doomsday Button never got pushed. Same with the Millennium Bug panic, where the whole world was just one programming error away from complete collapse. Get off the network, we were told. Get the emergency generator in. Stockpile rice.

I didn't really take it too seriously. Like most sane people I was drinking champagne the night of 31 January, 1999. The lights stayed on, no aeroplanes crashed to earth, everything was fine: it had either (a) all been a huge misunderstanding or (b) the programmers had got the problem fixed.

Which explains why--no matter how terrible the pronouncements from the climate change doom-sayers--I'd somehow thought that we’d muddle through to the other side, a bit battered maybe, but also maybe a little wiser too. I was, despite coming across to mostpeople as a constitutional pessimist, on the side of the bright green optimists: we can bootstrap our way out of this, folks!

I think I’ve had some kind of apocalypse-satori, though. Mike Davis, writing in Salon, thinks we’re doomed. But then he would: he’s got history on that score. Likewise with James Kunstler and his weekly tirades on the imminent collapse of American civilisation. Par for the course.

But when the writers at Worldchanging and BoingBoing--bright green sang-froiders to a fault--begin to concede that it’s not so much if there’ll be a crash as when, then maybe it’s time to start stockpiling rice.

And let’s not even talk about the news (which I have from Kris) that a certain guru is saying that the most spiritual thing one could do at the moment is to grow one’s own food.

What is one meant to do with such information? I don’t honestly know. I can’t predict or direct anyone else’s reaction. All I know is that I feel strangely calm at the moment. It could be denial. In fact it’s most likely denial. But there may also be some small remnants of optimism left. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not at all hopeful that we’ll get out of this without a lot of pain (history’s not encouraging on that point), but I do have some hope that when (if?) the crisis comes there’s a small chance the human spirit could show us that it's large, more generous, and more foresighted than we'd previously thought possible.

Yeah, it’s a small chance, I know, but better than no chance at all...

Read on...

Wednesday 9 July 2008

Dead to the World

Three months since my last post, but really and truly there's been nothing to report. Frankly I wouldn't be even offering this update except that Kris sort of guilted me into it.

I'm still working away on the book. I might even be nearing the end of the whole process. But it means I'm passing through that stage where I'm living my life almost entirely on an interior level; I'm going through the motions of training, working, etc., but I'm preserving as much energy as I can for the writing. I'm not even really reading that much, and what I am reading is pretty schlocky; the sort of stuff I'd be embarrassed to name-check here.

It's a very boring life, really, for those looking in from the outside.

Mind you, I did lay down my pen for the memorable Saturday in May when Munster won the Heineken Cup for the second time in three seasons. Much joy and hugging of strangers. Having said that, I suspect it will the last game of rugby I'll ever enjoy in that way again: I really have very serious doubts about these bloody Experimental Law Variations...

Read on...

Wednesday 9 April 2008

Status Report...

Can't believe it's been nearly a month since I've posted here, but there really has been nothing important to report. Life is more or less divided into those times when I'm writing and those times when my body is occupied at the gym or at work and I'm merely thinking about writing.

The Muse has only twice in recent times relaxed her grip on me: the first for Munster's Heineken Cup quarter-final against Gloucester, the result of which left me very happy, and the second for Armonico Consort's performance of Mozart's The Magic Flute, which left me rather less elevated.

It was a diverting but shallow interpretation of the opera. The Consort's sense of the drama was lively but also fairly broad: they never really tried to play it as anything other than a musical-pantomime, which I feel rather misses the point. There are certainly elements of pantomime in The Magic Flute, but there are also moments of high and sacred seriousness: it's a sacred pantomime, if you will. And the difference is...? Well, the difference is between treating the opera as essentially a frivolous piece enlivened by Mozart's beautiful music, and treating it as a serious work of art--taking Schikaneder and Mozart at their word, as it were--but playing it with a light and child-like (though not childish) touch. This is not easily done. In sixteen years of collecting various versions of the opera on tape, CD, VHS and DVD, I've come across only one that manages to successfully walk the tightrope between the low comedy and the high ritual, and that's William Christie's account with Les Arts florrisants.

Christie and his company play the Singspiel as a Sacred Comedy, pitched effortlessly between mystery and joy. They get that it was written with humour, whilst being entirely free of irony, and that Mozart and Schikaneder meant for the initiatory journey of Tamino and Pamina to be regarded as conveying a universal truth about the human condition, and not merely as a quaint little fairy-tale. All in all, it's an extraordinary performance, and my one regret is that it is only available on CD; no filmed version appears to exist.

The Consort plugged into the initiatory aspect of the opera just once, which is a shame, because when they did--from the start of the chorale of The Helmeted Men to the triumphant conclusion in C Major of Tamino and Pamina's ordeals--everything came together for them and they produced music and drama that was simultaneously beautiful, moving, solemn and, most of all, joyous.

Read on...

Thursday 13 March 2008

Aisling

A few things. First, Aisling Ltd is back on the web, temporarily housed in 250MB of server space kindly lent to me by a colleague at work.

Second, I've been thinking about Tara again, prompted by Seamus Heaney's recent comments on the building of the Skyrne Valley motorway.

A couple of quotes:

Mr Heaney ... said that Tara represented "an ideal of the spirit" that was fundamental to what Ireland meant. "Tara means something equivalent to what Delphi means to the Greeks, or maybe Stonehenge to an English person, or Nara in Japan, which is one of the most famous sites in the world," he said.

"It’s a word that conjures an aura — it conjures up what they call in Irish dúchas, a sense of belonging, a sense of patrimony, a sense of an ideal, an ideal of the spirit if you like, that belongs in the place. And if anywhere in Ireland conjures that up, it’s Tara."
and
The route of the road, Mr Heaney added, breached the fundamental principles that lay behind the foundation of the modern state. "The Proclamation of the Irish Republic in 1916 summoned people in the name of the dead generations," he said. "If ever there was a place that deserved to be preserved in the name of the dead generations from prehistoric times up to historic times up to completely recently, it was Tara."
The newspaper article from which these quotes are taken is headlined "Seamus Heaney laments loss of Ireland’s ancient spirit", and that's a good choice of verb; the lament is a venerable poetic form, especially in Ireland, and a form, moreover, which the poet uses to excoriate the mendacity of the lords of the land, which is precisely what Heaney is doing here.

Now, and without wishing to be solipsistic appear self-absorbed, I have to point out that the aisling is also an old Irish poetic form in which the poet, powerless politically, but still powerfully articulate, laments his situation and the situation of his country. It is no coincidence that the title of my novel is Aisling Ltd, and nor is it a coincidence that it is also the name of the eponymous company with which the book is concerned.

On the surface, the book was, yes, an essay in satirising the pretensions of the Celtic Tiger (no surprise to those few who have read it). Now, however, more than two years after the its publication, the satire seems less important to me, mostly because it seems that I was all along, and without knowing it, really writing a lament for a certain way of understanding Irishness--a way that is today almost entirely discredited except amongst poets and those with a poetic temperament.

Read on...

Monday 25 February 2008

Wild in the Head

I have just finished reading Wild: An Elemental Journey by Jay Griffiths. It's some book. I don't often react to books the way I reacted to this book.

Superficially, in terms of subject matter, Wild is an account of Griffith's search for 'wildness' in various of the Earth's jungles, seas, mountains and deserts, although really it's about Griffith's struggle to find wildness and freedom in her own head (and body, it should be added: many of Griffith's metaphors and turns of phrase are calculatedly carnal); or possibly, coming at it from a slightly different angle, it's really about Griffith's efforts to find healing for her depression, which she thinks of as a deep soul-wound, in the wild places of the world.

But we've lately had plenty of memoirs about depression; one could easily tire of reading about the attempts of various writers to write themselves out from underneath the deep shade of the noon-day demon. What is remarkable about Griffith's book is not, then, so much the impulse that led to its creation, nor even the subject-matter, but the tone in which it is written and the artistry with which it is crafted. The tone is vatic, ecstatic: the book is, literally, inspired, in the old sense of that word. But the energy of this inspiration is channelled along the conduits of a very craft-minded consciousness. Wild is a crafted book, full of crafted prose; prose, moreover, that aspires to and often achieves the status of poetry, a book-length poem in prose, in which the words often take off in flights of onomatopoeic, synaesthetic, and neologistic joy. ('Take off'; 'flights': I do not use these words errantly--Wild is full of birds and if it is true that all art aspires to the condition of music, then Wild specifically aspires to the condition of bird song.)

What is also remarkable about Wild is that its artistry, its craft, arises out of her awareness of belonging to a tradition. The book very consciously (self-consciously even) comes out of the Romantic English tradition of poetic non-conformism: Bunyan, Milton, Blake, Shelley, etc. In many ways, Wild--especially in in its life-affirming if problematic coda (more on this below)--strikes me as being nothing so less as a modern attempt to complete Shelley's poetic fragmentThe Triumph of Life. This fragment, which Shelley left unfinished at his death, paints Life as an inexorable agent grinding down all human hopes, dreams and aspirations, but, since the poem started in Hell in imitation of Dante's The Divine Comedy, one could argue that it would have ended in imitation of Dante too, with a Heavenly reconciliation of Life to Man and Man to Life.

Wild, then, is the ghost of the Paradiso Shelley might have written, channelled through Griffiths for the benefit of the twenty-first century.

Is this too much? It's very rapturous, I know, but then, as I hinted above, I did react very rapturously to Wild: it generated in me that tingly energy I get in my belly when I come across art that is great and true. And yet, for all that it inspired me, it also infuriated me in almost equal measure--sometimes within the space of a single page; sometimes even within the space of a single paragraph!

Why? Simply because for all that the book is formally and poetically a work of 'Romanticism', it is philosophically a work of eco-feminism, which I have never--despite the many very fine poetic arguments made for it by such writers as Susan Griffin, Vandana Shiva, and Riane Eisler, etc.--found even remotely convincing.

The trouble with eco-feminism, as I see it, is the recourse it has to essentialism in its account both of nature and of women. The funny thing with eco-feminism is that it does not reject--as you might expect it to--the binary divisions so beloved of patriarchy (male/female, light/dark, heaven/hell, tame/wild, civilised/savage, etc.) but simply reverses them in order to offer a matriarchal mirror-image, substituting one set of essences for another, only with the order of marginalisation reversed so that what was bad is now good--wild better than tame, dark better than light, feminine better than masculine, and so on. It amounts to the enfranchisement of those who are currently disenfranchised, and the disenfranchisement of those currently in power, which makes for a nice revenge fantasy but is arguably not the best possible future one could imagine for the human race.

Nor does it tell a very convincing story about humanity's history. Since eco-feminists hold the feminine essences to be essentially (!) superior to the masculine they can only account for the suppression and marginalisation of the former through recourse to conspiracy theories. It woz the Xtian God wot done it, they argue, or His Priests; or maybe the Puritans, or almost certainly the Capitalists. It woz--needless to say--the Men, which is hardly the most sophisticated account of history you'll ever come across; it's more attuned to fable than actuality (though of course my penchant for seriousness is obviously a symptom of patriarchal sympathies, a sign that I wish to repress the fabular feminine).

Regrettably, there's a lot--an awful lot--of this sort of sloppy thinking in Wild, which accounts for my frustration with it. Given the post-structuralist turn in philosophy--no, scratch that, given the existentialist turn in philosophy--the notion that politics and history, not to mention individual identity, can be accounted for in terms of stable, static, and timeless binary categories is hopelessly outdated, the result of cleaving to a satisfying but simplistic model of Reality that occludes the contingency and complexity of the way things actually are.

Funnily thing is, I half suspect that Griffiths knows this; and although she never admits it to herself or to the reader, it's indisputably there (though perhaps only at an unconscious or intuitive level) in her idea of the wild as that which is self-willed. This formula ('wildness = self-willing') is the only gesture towards a definition of wildness that Griffith offers, but it is a hugely significant gesture, being more of an existentialist than an essentialist gesticulation.

Existentialism has as one of its core propositions the idea that existence precedes essence, which is to say that the essence of an individual existence can only be determined after the individual's death, if even then, and only according to the actions the individual performed in his or her life (rather than according to the abstract categories assigned to the individual by his or her society).

To put it aphoristically, existentialism rejects what Being is for what Being does.

The consequences of this proposition for individual and political action are profound because, if true, it makes us each responsibility for who we become. Our individual 'essence' is not given to us at our birth according to some binary and Platonic schema (our 'isness') but is, rather, something we create through our the action (the 'doing') of our self-will.

Given this, I find it very interesting that Griffiths should see in wildness the very essence--the quintessence--of self-will, both because (a) it offers a new way of thinking about existentialism in an environmental context and because (b) it calls into question the anthropocentric existentialist distinction between being-in-itself (being which is not free and cannot change its essence, including the being of animals) and being-for-itself (being which is free and can change its essence; i.e., human 'being'). Since I only finished the book a few nights ago I'm not yet anywhere near working out the implications of this manoeuvre, but the idea of the wild as a site (perhaps even the site?) of existential self-willing environmentalism is a very exciting, if as yet nebulous, notion.

And yet Griffiths, having raised the idea, then completely ignores it and fails to (or even resists) incorporating it into her actual argument.

Take her symptomatic final chapter, 'Wild Mind,' in which she tries to persuade us that the concepts of freedom/self-willing/the wild can be equated with Comedy--can be equated with a comedic, Dionysian sense of life--and that patriarchy, conversely, is burdened with an essentially (that word again) tragic or Apollonian disposition. It's not, for me at least, a terribly successful argument, and Griffiths doesn't help her case by bringing in Shakespeare as her exemplar, claiming him as essentially (bored now...) a comedic writer.

She might have chosen a better example. To claim Shakespeare as essentially or primarily a comedic or carnivalesque writer is to ignore what most people would claim as the greatest fruits of his genius, namely the four tragedies (Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, and Macbeth). And it is also ignore the fact that Shakespeare never hewed very closely to the classical lineaments of dramatic form; indeed, his final plays are often called, to the dismay of categorising academics, tragi-historical-comedies because they really do seem to contain all human life--the high, the low, the tragic, the bawdy, all paradoxically jostling together.

It's the same with the wild, with wilderness; wild mind will never generated by those in hock to binaries, but only by those who are willing to accept that existence is a mash-up of tragedy and comedy and morality play and history play with a little bit of soap opera too, and maybe even some genuinely operatic melodrama thrown only if you're in any way passionate.

Read on...

Friday 22 February 2008

Bonkers Science

Two reports on recent scientific experiments have got me a bit worried: the first is about

seven researchers [who] used sophisticated brain-scanning technology to record how subjects' brains responded to television advertisements, while simultaneously collecting the subjects' reported impressions of the ads. By comparing the two resulting data sets, they say, they pinned down specific locations in the brain as the seat of many familiar emotions that ripple throughout it.
The purpose of the research?
"We are getting to the heart of the matter by really showing this process in the brain, and how it works," said Jon Morris, a professor of advertising and communications and lead author of the article. "We feel that this can be used to find out what people really feel about something, whether an advertisement or any other stimulus."
Am I over-reacting when I find this not only distasteful but also slightly frightening, in a Huxleyan, Brave New World kind-of-way? I mean, I'm only going on a gut reaction here because I haven't read the full paper, but no, I think the article provides enough information to say, with some conviction, that this research is an example of instrumental reason gone wrong. It's is wrong because the researchers don't seemed at all concerned with understanding humans any better than before (what, after Habermas, you might call 'hermeneutic reason'), and it's wrong because the researchers obviously aren't bothered that their results could be used for some potentially oppressive ends (Habermas's 'critical reason'). It is wrong because the researchers seem solely concerned with providing advertisers with more finely calibrated tools for manipulating the populace, and that judgement ought to stand until the researchers prove otherwise.

Of course, you might with some justification accuse me of left-wing bias in this assessment. And yes, I have to admit that on most scales, I do tip more towards the progressive/left-wing side than towards the conservative, right-wing side. But my opposition to the uncritical and sub-hermeneutic deployment of instrumental reason extends to its left-wing uses too. The second article that has recently unnerved me describes research conducted by two progressive Stanford University scholars into the question of whether selective pressures operate within human culture as well as human biology. Notwithstanding the observation that human culture is too complicated and multi-faceted a phenomenon to be accounted for wholly or even partially in evolutionary terms (a point raised in the article but never directly refuted or countered), what is more worrying is the stated purpose of the research: according to Paul Ehrlich, the Bing Professor of Population Studies at Stanford, the aim of his analysis is to find out how "how cultures change and how we can ethically influence that process".

How we can ethically influence that process. For all that I'm sympathetic to Ehrlich's politics, that statement is profoundly worrying to me. Have his forgotten the twentieth century's disastrous experiments in large scale social 'engineering', based on simplistic, one dimensional notions of human nature? God spare us from the good intentions of instrumentalists on either wing of the political divide!

To end on a positive note, though: I have read one article recently that reassured me that some sanity and common sense still exists in the world.

Read on...